Abstract: In this paper we present a tool (CMC) for compositional modelchecking of real-time systems. CMC is based on a completely di erent method compared to existing real-time veri cation tools (HYTECH, KRONOS, UP-PAAL). After a description of the method, we illustrate its e ciency by considering two examples : the Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol and a railroad crossing system.
INTRODUCTION
Within the last decade, model-checking has turned out to be a useful and successful technique for the veri cation of temporal properties in nite state systems. More recently, serious attempts have been made to extend the success of model-checking to the setting of real-time systems, with timed automata 2] as models. The major obstacle for the model-checking approach is the wellknown state explosion problem due to parallel composition (as in the untimed case) and also to time encoding. Several heuristics have been proposed to overcome this problem : symbolic model-checking 10], on-the-y technique 6, 19 ], e cient data-structures for time constraints 17, 4] . These and other techniques have been implemented into tools (KRONOS 22] , UPPAAL 19] and HYTECH 11] ) and a number of industrial case studies have been analyzed and veri ed using these tools 12, 13, 5, 20, 9] .
In 16] we proposed a rst compositional model-checking technique, which in a number of practical examples seems to avoid the state explosion problem. In this method, we never construct nor examine the global (symbolic) state space of a real-time system modeled as a network (A 1 j : : :jA n ) of timed automata.
Rather, when checking the system for a property ', the components A 1 ; : : :; A n are gradually removed from the network and incorporated into the formula; thus, the component A n could be initially transfered from the network into the property ' yielding a new quotient property '=A n which expresses the precise property which has to be satis ed by the remaining network (A 1 j : : :jA n? 1 ) in order that the original property ' holds for the complete system. Now by repeatedly quotienting components from the network into the formula, we will nally be faced with the problem of establishing that the process nil (a process capable of performing no action at all) satis es the last formula. A key point of this approach is to develop e cient simpli cation strategies in order to keep a small size of the quotiented formula.
In this paper we extend the compositional method in several ways. Firstly, we develop the method to a larger class of timed automata (with invariants and atomic propositions). Secondly we introduce a completely new (and considerably more e cient) quotient construction and speci c simpli cation techniques adapted to our formalisms. Finally we present CMC a new real-time veri cation tool implementing the compositional method.
Plan of the paper: we rst introduce the formalisms used in CMC : networks of timed automata used for the modeling of real-time systems, and the timed modal logic L for specifying properties. We then present the quotient construction together with the simpli cation strategies emphasizing those dealing with clock constraints. Finally we illustrate the method with two examples. The rst example is Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol 1, 21], which is a classical benchmark in this domain. Here our results both demonstrate the e ciency as well as the limits of the compositional approach. The second example is the railroad crossing system. In this example, L proves to be an extremely convenient speci cation language, and our results proves that compositional method is useful for arbitrary systems and not only for networks with a symmetrical structure as in Fischer's protocol.
NETWORKS OF TIMED AUTOMATA
Let A be a nite set of actions and AP a nite set of atomic propositions. We denote by N the set of natural numbers and by R the set of non{negative real numbers. denotes the set of delay actions f (d) j d 2 Rg. If C is a set of clocks, B(C) denotes clocks constraints over C, that is the set of formulas built using boolean connectives over atomic formulas of the form x ./ m or x?y ./ m with x; y 2 C, m 2 N and ./2 f=; <; >; ; g. De nition 1 A timed automaton A over A is a tuple hN; 0 ; C; E; l; Invi where N is a nite set of nodes, 0 is the initial node, C is a nite set of clocks, E N B(C) A 2 C N corresponds to the set of edges: e = h ; g; a; r; 0 i 2 E represents an edge from the node to the node 0 with action a, r denotes the set of clocks to be reset and g is the enabling condition (the guard) over the and c1 has \:= 1" as action, fx1g as reset set and the enabling condition for the edge is x1 < 1. Node b1 has the invariant x1 < 1 to enforce progress from the node before one time-unit elapses. The default invariant (for nodes a1, c1 and cs1) is true. Note that the automaton V is a \classical" automaton (without clock). 2 A state or a con guration of an automaton A is a pair ( ; v) where is a node of A and v a time assignment for C. Informally, the system starts at node 0 with all its clocks initialized to 0 (i.e. with the time assignment v 0 ). In fact, f is an n-ary synchronization function with renaming. We denote by (A 1 j : : :jA n ) f the parallel composition of A 1 ,: : :,A n w.r.t. the synchronization function f. A network con guration is a pair h ; vi where = ( 1 ; : : :; n ) is vector of nodes and v is a valuation for C = i C i , i.e. the clocks of the network (we denote by v i the restriction v jCi ).
The semantics of (A 1 j : : :jA n ) f can be de ned as a labeled timed transition system whose states are the con gurations of the network and the transitions are given by the two following rules: A pre x of an execution for FP.
Example 2 Consider again the automata V , P1 and P2 of gure 1.1. This system describes Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol: two processes (modeled by P1 and P2) both try to reach a critical section (cs1 and cs2 resp.). To guarantee mutual exclusion of the critical sections, P1 and P2 share a variable (modeled by the process V ) which can be assigned to 0,1 or 2 by the processes. Moreover the current value of V can be read by the two processes. Note that we can easily de ne new operators as tt, ff, ' ) (if no identi er occur in '). The meaning of the identi ers is speci ed by a declaration D assigning a formula of L to each identi er. Given S = (A 1 j : : :jA n ) f a network of TA, we interpret the formulas of L with respect to extended con gurations h ; v; ui, where h ; vi is a con guration of S and u is a time assignment for K. Whereas the classical modal operators hai and a] deal with action transitions, the operator h i (resp. ] ) denotes existential (resp. universal) quanti cation over delay transitions. The K clocks are so-called formula clocks, used as stopwatches for measuring the time elapsing between states (speci ed as properties) of the system. The formula clocks increase synchronously with the automata clocks. The formula (xin') initializes the formula clock x to 0 and the formula (x ./ m) are used to compare the value of x in the current extended con guration with an integer value. Finally, an extended con guration satis es an identi er Z if it belongs to the maximal solution of the equation Z = D(Z). The atomic propositions can be of the form p or A j :p (to specify that p holds for component A j ) and they can be in the scope of a negation. The formal de nition of L semantics is given in A network of timed automata is described by using a n-ary synchronization function but it is easier to consider binary synchronization between A n and the remaining part to de ne the quotient construction. Since our synchronization function allows renaming, we can easily decompose a parallel composition Theorem 1 Let A 1 ,: : :,A n be n timed automata hN i ; i;0 ; C i ; E i ; l i ; Inv i i. Let ' be a L formula over the set of clocks K, all over an action set A. Let h( ; ); vw; ui be an extended con guration of ((A 1 j : : :jA n?1 ) f 0 jA n ) f with v 2 R i<n C i , w 2 R Cn and u 2 R K , then we have: that contrary to the quotient de ned in 16] we do not quotient the formula for any node and any clock region since we insert explicitly guards into the formula (and not only their truth value w.r.t. the regions). This explain why such a quotient is much more compact and more e cient than the rst one. Then it is easy to see that any timed automaton A is strongly bisimilar 2 to the network (niljA) and hence can be proved to satisfy the same formula of L . Using this observation, the quotient construction can be used to obtain alternative model{checking algorithms for L as follows: A j = ' , (niljA) j = ' , nil j = ' A. Due to the projective nature of it is clear that ' A contains no action modalities, and it is easy to build a special purpose model-checker for the simple automaton nil.
Note that the quotient de nition would support the introduction of negation in the logic (by a simple propagation) and this would allow to use minimal xpoint in the speci cation and then increase its expressive power. Nevertheless such an extension would require to adapt the simpli cation rules.
Simpli cation Strategies
We have seen in the previous section that repeated quotienting leads to an explosion in the formula. This phenomena was already observed in 16, 18, 15] and in the untimed case in 3]. An e cient way to avoid this explosion consists in applying simpli cation rules after each quotient.
First we need simpli cations to tackle the explosion due to the parallel composition (occurring with the quotienting of the variables). This can be done by using the classical rules already used in the untimed case:
Boolean Simpli cation. Formulas may be simpli ed using the following sim- Secondly we have to add special simpli cations to deal with the clocks constraints. Indeed the major problem in the real-time systems analysis consists in the treatment of time encoding: simplifying test or reducing the number of clocks used in the speci cation can be crucial to succeed in the veri cation of a system. We developed several strategies which have been evaluated with CMC. Here we present two simpli cations which can be combined together and which lead to interesting results. The main idea is that we are interested in the truth value of a speci cation ' for extended con gurations (s; u 0 ) (with s a network con guration) with all formula clocks equal to zero. Using this information, it is sometimes possible to simplify the tests inside ': Hitzone Reduction. Consider the formula ' = a] (x > 1). Clearly ' is equivalent to a]f f for any extended con guration (s; u 0 ) because no a-transition can modify the value of the formula clock x (which is still equal to 0 after the transition). A more complex example is: = ] (x > 1 ) a] x < 1); for the same reason, is equivalent to ] (x > 1 ) a] ff).
Given a speci cation ', the principles of Hitzone reduction is to compute for any test t occurring in ' the clock constraints S t (i.e. the set of time assignments for the formula clocks) which are e ectively needed to evaluate the truth value of ' for any (s; u 0 ). Given this information (obtained by a xpoint computation) we can simplify by tt (resp. ff) the tests t for which the truth value is true (resp. false) for every time assignment in S t .
A more interesting example is the simpli cation of ' = (X 0 ; D) with the following declaration D:
An observation of the declaration shows that the truth value of X 2 is always considered from X 1 after a reset of x 2 or from its own de nition. Then the test x 1 x 2 in X 2 will always be equal to tt, therefore X 2 becomes a trivial equation and therefore X 1 too. Finally X 0 can be reduced to tt. Constraint Reduction. Another way to simplify the tests inside the formula is to compute the constraint associated to each variable X, that is the set of timed valuations which can satisfy the tests in its de nition. For example, the constraint of X def = x < 1^hai(y < 2) is x < 1^y < 2]: for any extended con guration ( ; v; u) satisfying X, we have u j = x < 1^y < 2. Each L operator has its own rule to propagate the constraint and a xpoint computation is necessary to obtain the nal constraint of any variable. For example, the constraint of a variable X def = x < 1^: : :^ ] X will be empty and X is then equal to ff.
Finally it is possible to combine the Hitzone and the Constraint redusctions to simplify the tests inside the formula. Note that these two simpli cations assume that the formula clocks and automata clocks are disjoint: we assume that the action transitions do not modify the value of formula clocks. Without these simpli cations, we could use automata clocks in formula.
Example 5 Recall Example 2. Without simpli cation (except boolean reductions) the quotient speci cation mut12= f V = f P1= f P2 contains 18 identi ers. Applying the minimization strategies of the CMC tool we nd that mut12= f V = f P1= f P2 is equivalent to tt. Then the property holds for the system. 2 Why it is e cient ? Quotienting immediately followed by the various simpli cation strategies often allows to dismiss parts of the quotiented component which are irrelevant to the speci c property in question. Also, the iterative strategy allows to deal with clock constraints after each quotienting i.e. before considering all clocks of the system, thus making simpli cation easier and more e cient (this will be clearly illustrated by Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH CMC
The compositional method has been implemented in the CMC 4 tool (written in C++) : it contains a command language and an environment to de ne networks of TA and L speci cations, and several functions to build quotient, to simplify formula (every reductions described in the previous sections has been implemented) : : :Moreover it contains a Check procedure to decide if a formula holds for the nil process. It is also possible to verify if two timed automata without invariant are bisimilar.
In this section we present two examples veri ed with CMC. The rst one is Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol, which is a benchmark in the timed verication area. This example is interesting because it shows both the power of compositional approach and its limits. Here we address the two classical versions of the protocol and we present a third one. The second example is the train crossing example. Its purpose is to show that L is an expressive speci cation language: we write a short speci cation including safety properties, bounded liveness property etc. Moreover, whereas Fischer's protocol has a symmetrical structure potentially making the compositional approach more e cient, the train crossing example has no special structure thus showing that the method is not limited to special systems but can be applied to arbitrary networks of timed automata.
Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol described in the example 2 is a benchmark of the veri cation of timed systems. Consider n processes P i , the problem is to verify that at any time at most one process can access its critical section: we want to verify that for any i; j 2 f1; : : :; ng with i 6 = j, Mut (i;j) holds for the initial con guration of the system. Remember that In order to verify Mut (1;2) e ciently, we need to carefully choose the order in which the processes are quotiented. In fact, since Mut (1;2) only directly deals with the processes V , P 1 and P 2 , we may hope that quotienting these three components will su ce for determining the truth value of the formula. Using CMC, we start by quotienting V , then P 1 and nally P 2 . The simpli cation rules allow to deduce tt ! To evaluate the e ciency of the method we give the size of the speci cation (i.e. the number of variables). For example, we have the following computation 5 for n = 100: These results can be read as follows: The quotient of Mut (1;2) by V 100 gives a speci cation with 202 variables which are reduced to 102 after the simpli cations, then the quotient by P 1 gives 404 variables which are reduced to 202, and nally the quotient of P 2 gives 800 variables which are reduced to the single formula tt. Of course a complete veri cation needs to do such a computation for any Mut (i;j) but by choosing the right order for removing the components the previous result shows that the method can be successfully applied. Note that the compositional approach is very e cient in this case: other existing real-time veri cation tools cannot verify this protocol with more than 15 processes.
In fact the previous version of Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol is not the complete protocol. The complete version is cyclic and is described on the left part of gure 1.3. The main point is that a process using the critical section can leave it and then reset the variable V . This version is much more di cult to verify. Indeed if we quotient Mut (1;2) (in which we add a term := 0]X in the conjunction) by V , P 1 and P 2 , we cannot deduce tt (contrary to what we claim in 15]) because at this step we know, thanks to the synchronization function, that other processes can perform the := 0 action and we have no information about when they can perform it. Typically if P 3 was just a process able to reset V at any time, then P 2 could access the critical section at the same time as P 1 . Then for this version of the protocol, we need to quotient all processes to nally deduce tt. And in this case, we cannot avoid the explosion of the size of the speci cation and we are limited to small systems. We obtain the following computation for 6 processes: The trains can send an App! (resp. Exit!) message to a controller to inform it of their arrival in (resp. departure from) the section before (resp. after) the gate. The gate can receive orders from the controller and can change its position (open or close) in at most 10 seconds. The controller uses the same strategy as the one presented in 8]: the idea is to count the number of trains which are staying between the App point and the Exit point and to use this information to decide if an Exit! message has to be followed by a GoUp! order. To model this strategy we use the automaton Counter whose nodes correspond to the possible values (bounded by 2). The synchronization function is given in 
